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ISSUES OF APPELLANT'S REPLY
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (U.R. App. P.) the Appellant
is to limit his reply to new material arising in the appeal. Such circumstances exist in
the instant appeal where counsel for the Appellee seems intent on focusing upon the
original affidavit of G. Scott Jensen, where in fact it is the subsequent supplemented
affidavit of this individual, an officer of the court, that Appellant has introduced as
newly discovered evidence meriting a reconsideration of his previously-adjudicated
claim.

JURISDICTION
While Appellee has filed a motion to transfer this appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court pursuant to Rule 44 U.R. App. P. and Section 78-2a-3 (2) (g) of the Utah Code
Annotated, Appellant has filed a response and objection with this Court contending
that jurisdiction properly lies with the Utah Court of Appeals. Appellant asks this Court
note that Appellee did not motion for a transfer until some six (6) months subsequent to
the filing of a notice of appeal. This Court did not, sua sponte, move to grant
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certification to the Utah Supreme Court utilizing Rule 43 U.R. App. P. Also, the Utah
Supreme Court once transferred jurisdiction upon Appellant's original appeal, before
the subsequent second affidavit was obtained, to the Utah Court of Appeals in
accordance with Section 78-2-2 (4) of the Utah Code Annotated (as amended).

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Petitioner concedes that this matter has been previously adjudicated upon an
appeal before this Court, although this occurred prior to Appellant's diligence and
persistence in obtaining the second, expanded Affidavit of G. Scott Jensen, an
attorney and officer of the court, regarding possible perjured testimony of Detective
Shane Miner and thus constitutes new evidence.
Petitioner / Appellant asserts that under law of the case doctrine, Court
adheres to it's own decision at earlier stage of litigation unless there are "cogent" or
"compelling" reasons not to, such as an intervening change of controlling law,
availability of new evidence, or the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest
injustice. Sanders v. Sullivan. 900 F.2d 601, 605 (2nd Cir. 1990) citing Doe v. New
York Citv Dept. of Social Services. 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2nd Cir.), sgrt- denied sub
nom. Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe. 464 U.S. 864,104 S. Ct. 195, 78 LEd.2d 171
(1983) (citations omitted).
The Sanders case, supra, presents an interesting scenario and parallel to the
instant appeal in that a recanting witness did not come forward until about two years
after conviction. In the Appellant's case. Affiant Jensen's memory was not refreshed
until Appellant sent him a photograph some nine (9) months after the Utah Court of
Appeals entered a decision in his original criminal appeal.

m

Appellant contends that such exigent circumstances, as in Sanders and the
instant appeal of a denial of extraordinary relief, would merit consideration under the
standard of review set forth for claims previously adjudicated on appeal in Hurst v.
Cook. 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Any constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules necessary for an
understanding of the issues of this appeal are either presented within this Reply Brief
or are contained within Appellant's original brief before this Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of a ruling entered on January 12,1993, by the Honorable
Michael J. Glasmann of the Second Judicial District Court, County of Weber, State of
Utah, wherein petition for writ of extraordinary relief was dismissed on the grounds that
it was frivolous.
The core issue of both the petition and the instant appeal is the existence of a
second, supplemental affidavit by G. Scott Jensen. This affidavit (See Appendix "B")
was obtained by Appellant Hendricks own diligence and persistence in sending Mr.
Jensen photographs of himself and communicating with Mr. Jensen, the attorney who
originally stood with Mr. Hendricks during his initial video arraignment, in an attempt
to refresh Mr. Jensen's memory as to events that happened at that arraignment. For it
is during this time period that one Detective Minor claims Mr. Hendricks "confessed"
to him the requisite elements of intent which resulted in Mr. Hendricks' conviction for
aggravated robbery. This second affidavit shows that such conversation never
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occurred between Detective Minor and Mr. Hendricks, and as such constitutes the
necessary new evidence that merits reconsideration of a previously adjudicated
claim.
This newly apparent evidence allows Appellant to raise collateral claims. His
claim of ineffectiveness regarding counsel Stephen Laker's being charged by the trial
Court with interviewing G. Scott Jensen and producing him before the court in order to
establish the veracity of the Detective's testimony. (See trial transcripts, page 122)
This omission by Mr. Laker merely adds to the manifest inefficiency with which he
handled Mr. Hendricks defense.
At this juncture, Appellant must call this Court's attention to the existence of two
separate affidavits by G. Scott Jensen, This first (See Appendix "A") dated
December 6,1988, where it is clear, through phone and mail communication with Mr.
Hendricks, that this officer of the court due to the large number of cases he handles
and the brevity of their encounter, does not quite recall the circumstances of the
incident.
While the second affidavit (See Appendix "B") dated November 12,1990,
reflects that Counselor Jensen, now having been provided a photograph of Mr.
Hendricks, clearly recalls the video arraignment and circumstances of it's
occurrence.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant asserts that any facts beyond those originally stated in the
Appellant's Brief (See Brief, Page 2,3,4 and 5), Appellee's Brief and the Statement of
the case as above, with the exception of the fact of the existence of the two (2)
(4)

affidavits of G. Scott Jensen, are unnecessary for an understanding of the issues
presented by this appeal. No objection is raised towards the Appellee's motion to
expand the record as this addition should serve to further illustrate counsel's, Mr.
Stephen Laker's ineffectiveness during the trial phase.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Second Judicial District Court, Honorable Michael J. Glasmann presiding,
improperly dismissed petition for extraordinary writ as frivolous. Although Petitioner's
allegations have been previously raised and adjudicated, new evidence of expanded
affidavit of G. Scott Jensen constitutes requisite new material necessary for denial of
due process claim allowing re-litigation as "ends of justice" may require. Further, to
time-bar meritorious constitutional claims from habeas corpus (extraordinary relief)
review runs afoul of both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Utah.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ALTHOUGH PREVIOUSLY RAISED OR
ADJUDICATED MERIT RECONSIDERATION DUE TO NEW EVIDENCE.
The Second District Court, Judge Michael J. Glasmann presiding, dismissed
petition for writ of extraordinary relief on the ground it was frivolous. A position which
the Appellees, in their brief, would have this Court affirm. See State v. Romano. 29
Utah 2d 237, 507 P.2d 1025 (1973) ("Frivolous" is defined as "having no basis in fact
or law"). However, Appellee's brief fails to objectively demonstrate how in fact the
claims are frivolous. The Appellees consistently overlook the second, refreshed
affidavit of G. Scott Jensen and instead focus on his first affidavit. The difference of
(5)

these two (2) affidavits is manifest. (See Appendix "A" and "B"). For the later statement
by Affiant Jensen completely refutes the testimony of Detective Minor. Testimony
which was used to form the intent necessary to gain a conviction of aggravated
robbery against Mr. Hendricks. (See Appendix "B" nos. 4 and 5).
The second affidavit of G. Scott Jensen is newly discovered evidence.
Appellant Hendricks asks that accord be given the dates of the affidavits (Affidavit "A"
dated December 6,1988) and (Affidavit "B" dated November 12,1990). Clearly, the
merits of the second affidavit and it's resultant claims were not reached on the original
appeal, as the Utah Court of Appeals filed it's opinion in Mr. Hendricks criminal
appeal on February 5.1990, some nine (9) months prior to Mr. Hendricks even
obtaining the second affidavit of G. Scott Jensen.
Apparently there has been some confusion regarding the existence of two (2)
separate affidavits by the same individual, G. Scott Jensen. This confusion persists in
that even to this date Appellees only mention the first affidavit in their reply brief to the
instant appeal.
In reviewing a dismissal of a habeas corpus petition, the appellate court
examines the record" in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment.... and
will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis in the record to support the trial court's
denial of the writ." Hall v. Utah Board of Pardons. 806 P2d 217 (Utah App. 1991)
(citations omitted). As shown by Affiant Jensen's statement (See Appendix "B" no. 7)
the testimony of Detective Minor at Mr. Hendricks trial was false. In White v. Raaen.
324 U.S. 760 (1953), the United States Supreme Court has held that a conviction
secured by the use of perjured testimony is lacking due process. In Sanders v.
Sullivan. 863 F.2d 218 (2nd Cir. 1988) the court reasoned :
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"[ I ]t has long been axiomatic that due process requires us
"to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very
concept of justice." It is simply intolerable, in our view that
under no circumstance will due process be violated if a
state allows an innocent person to remain incarcerated
on the basis of lies."
Sanders 863 F.2d at 224, quoting Lisenba v. California. 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S. Ct.
280, 290, 86 L.Ed. 166(1941).
However, due process notwithstanding, the appellate court need only review
the correctness of the dismissal, which is plainly incorrect for failure to encompass the
second affidavit of Affiant Jensen. A situation which has occurred throughout postconviction proceedings in Mr. Hendricks case. See U.S. v. Rivera. 900 F.2d 1462,
1469 (10th. Cir. 1990) (The cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless
errors has the potential to prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a single
reversible error).

POINT II
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE NOT TIME-BARRED
AS THEY RAISE MERITORIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Appellees contend that any habeas corpus action is barred by Section 78-1231.1 of the Utah Code Annotated (as amended) which requires that a habeas corpus
action must be commenced within three (3) months from the time petitioner knew of
grounds for relief or should have know of such grounds. If this statute is deemed
applicable to this litigation, then the statute itself must be held to be unconstitutional.
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution provide that the
"Privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended." Article I, Section 9;
Article I. Section 5, respectively.

The statute relied upon by the Appeliees would clearly suspend the writ of
habeas corpus, and its successor the writ of extraordinary relief, after the three month
period had expired even though a petitioner has a meritorious constitutional claim.
Thus, the state's (Appellees) effort to procedurally eliminate this petition and appeal
must fail.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is shown that the Second District Court Judge
Michael J. Glasmann's dismissal of petition was improper. Accordingly, Appellant
prays this Court vacate the dismissal, remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on
the merits where upon vindication of the claims the relief prayed for in the petition may
be granted.

Dated this ACr

day of July, 1993.

Respectfully submitted,

Lyle/C. Hendricks
Attorney, Pro Se
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
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APPENDIX

AFFIDAVIT OF G. SCOTT JENSEN
I, G.

SCOTT JENSEN, being

first duly

sworn upon oath,

depose and say as follows:
1.

That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the

State of Utah.
2.

That on December 9, 1987 I worked on a part-time basis

with the Weber County Public Defender Association.
3.

It is possible on December 9, 1987 I stood with Mr. Lyle

C. Hendricks for an arraignment.
4.

After discussing the matter with Martin Gravis, the

history of the case sounded vaguely familiar and I might have been
the one who stood up with Lyle during his arraignment.
5.

I do not remember having an conversation with Stephen

Laker regarding Mr. Lyle Hendricks.
6.

If I was the attorney who was present with Mr. Hendricks

during his arraignment, I have no recollection of what took place at
the arraignment, ox of any conversation witn Stephen Laker.
DATED this

fn

day of December, 1988.

G. SCOTT
Attorne
/

SUBSCRIBED
December, 1988.

AND

SWORN

to

before me

this

{JJ

My Commission Expires:
Notary Public
Residing

^\^Qj\rUdD\J^

day

of
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